Northvolt had US$55 billion in orders just before it went bankrupt. The cost of skipping the development of a commercial pathway.

Written By Derek Thomson

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It’s a warning for any board that treats an order book as proof of revenue.

Northvolt was founded in 2015 by two former Tesla executives to be Europe’s answer to Chinese battery manufacturing. Backed by Volkswagen and Goldman Sachs, it raised more than US$10 billion and signed US$55 billion in orders. It never got its first plant working at scale. As Marie Mannes reported for Reuters, it filed for bankruptcy in Sweden in March 2025 with just over US$8 billion of debt. As Tim De Chant reported for TechCrunch, the collapse came down to execution, not weak demand.

Northvolt had a technology roadmap, a manufacturing plan and a very large funding story. What it lacked was a commercial pathway. That means a deliberate order of steps linking proven production, committed customers, new capacity and capital, where each step is paid for by the one before it. Northvolt ran all four at the same time.

In my view, had Northvolt’s board treated the commercial pathway as seriously as the engineering, the outcome may have been different. It would not have solved the yield problem. It would have limited what that problem cost, and kept customers and investors committed long enough to fix it.

Five lessons stand out for any business building a commercial strategy around speed to revenue.

  • An order book is not revenue. Northvolt’s Skellefteå plant delivered less than 1% of its 16 GWh capacity in 2023. Build the strategy around what the business can deliver this quarter at the price it agreed. Treat every contract signed ahead of proven capacity as a risk to manage, not a result to announce.
  • Prove the first plant before building the next. Construction in Germany began in March 2024, while Skellefteå was still producing a fraction of its capacity. Focus on one product, one site and one or two customers until the unit economics work. Commit capital to the next stage only once yield, output and cost targets are met.
  • Hire for the hardest risk. High-yield cell manufacturing was the critical skill, and Northvolt relied on Chinese machinery and staff to deliver it. Every scale-up has one skill that decides whether revenue arrives on time. Put someone who has done that exact job before into the leadership team before the ramp-up starts.
  • Anchor contracts cut both ways. BMW’s €2 billion order was the proof of demand until delivery delays turned it into a cancellation in June 2024. Negotiate volumes that increase in steps and delivery dates that follow a realistic ramp-up. Where possible, use prepayments or take-or-pay terms so the customer helps fund the scale-up.
  • Raise against milestones, not the vision. Burning about US$100 million a month, Northvolt filed for Chapter 11 in November 2024 with about US$30 million in cash. Tie each funding round to evidence such as first revenue, yield targets and anchor contracts that convert into orders. The next raise then rests on results, not on a promise.

Nobody could have predicted every headwind Northvolt faced, including Chinese competition on price and a slower European market for electric vehicles. But a slower, more deliberate path would have reached lasting revenue sooner. The same choice faces critical minerals processors, hydrogen developers and any company scaling a first-of-its-kind plant.

For those boards, the question worth asking isn’t how big the order book is. It’s how much of it you could deliver next quarter at the volume, quality and level of service your customers were promised.

#BatteryManufacturing #Northvolt #Infrastructure #Commercialisation #EnergyTransition

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